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ARTICLES
MAINTAINING UNIFORMITY IN
INTERNATIONAL UNIFORM LAW VIA
AUTONOMOUS INTERPRETATION:
SOFTWARE CONTRACTS AND
THE CISG
Frank Diedricht
I. INTRODUCTION
International Uniform Law is a good thing in theory: The
attainment of legal certainty via well-balanced subsidiary rules
made for international contracts and the avoidance of weak
legal relationships are among its major goals.1 The goal of the
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods (CISG),2 as stated in its preamble, 3 is to support
the international trade and exchange of goods. However, Inter-
national Uniform Law, including the CISG, lacks a common
legal theory and practice upon which judges and practitioners
t Dr. iur., 1994; M.L.E., 1990, Universit~t Hannover Germany; Universitat
Rostock.
1 See KEGEL, INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 112 (7th ed. 1995) for a discus-
sion of the international uniform application of private law as the supreme goal of
both unified and non-unified private international law.
2 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, opened for signature Apr. 11, 1980, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/18, Annex I
(1980), reprinted in S. TREATY Doc. No. 98-9, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1983), Offi-
cial Records, U.N. Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods
178-90, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/19(1981) and 19 I.L.M. 668 (1980) [hereinafter
CISGI. In force since January 1, 1988, the CISG has been applicable in the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany since January 1, 1991, 568 BGBI. I, 11 (1989). It has
been applicable in the former German Democratic Republic since March 1, 1990,
GBI. DDR II 65 (1989). Equally authentic are the English, French, Spanish, Rus-
sian, Arabic and Chinese text of the CISG. The English and French text in connec-
tion with the official German translation can, e.g., be found in HERBER &
CZERWENKA, INTERNATIONALES KAUFREcHT 475 (1991).
3 See HERBER & CZERWENKA, supra note 2, at 417-18.
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can rely.4 This results in the well-known "homeward-trend" in
favor of the lex fori5 when international lawyers interpret con-
tractual language. 6 Such an interpretation puts a uniform ap-
plication of International Uniform Law at risk. With every new
ratification, it becomes more unlikely that an international
court will be established to ensure the uniform interpretation
and application of the CISG and other uniform laws in the con-
tracting states. Problems of binding force, seat and procedure
may be too great to overcome in interpreting the CISG.
The globalization of business has resulted in transborder
data exchanges that have made the linkage of communication
systems necessary. One may even regard such linkages as a
"second industrial revolution"7 with computer software sent
from one continent to another by wire or even satellite. The
parties to these international transactions are most likely
unaware that the law governing them is underdeveloped. Legal
certainty will not be improved if the rising number of interna-
tional contracts for the transfer of software are reviewed on
a case-by-case basis using only one body of law for
interpretation.8
Most international software contracts consist of the trans-
fer of a ready-to-install computer program (either standard or
bespoke software) in exchange for a sum of money. Such con-
4 See Merryman, On the Convergence and Divergence of the Civil Law and the
Common law, 17 STAN. J. INT'L L. 357, 365 (1981).
5 Lex fori refers to "the law of the forum or court; that is, the positive law of
the state, country, or jurisdiction of whose judicial system the court where the suit
is brought or remedy sought is an integral part." BLACes LAw DICTIONARY 910 (6th
ed. 1990).
6 For a discussion of the problem of the "homeward trend" under non-unified
conflict of law rules, see KEGEL, supra note 1, at 114-15.
7 The "Industrial Revolution" was "a rapid and major change in an economy
m.. Marked by the general introduction of power-driven machinery or by an impor-
tant change in the prevailing types and methods of use of such machines." WEB-
STERS NINTH COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 617 (1987).
8 For an American point of view on this issue, see Primak, Computer
Software: Should the U.N. Convention of Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods Apply? A Contextual Approach to the Question, 9 COMPuTER/L.J. 197 (1991);
Fakes, The Application of the United Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods to Computer, Software and Database Transactions, 3 SoFrwARE L.J.
559 (1990). For a German point of view, see MUGLICH, SOFTWAREUBERLASUNG NACH
US-AMERIKANISCHEM VORBILD ZUR tYBERTRAGBARKEIT DES UCC IN DAS DEUTSCHE
RECHT, 648-53 CR (1991).
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tracts have on their face the features of a sale of goods.9 This
characterization is also in accordance with a comparative law
classification, 10 since within the largest legal systems in the
world, a contract under which the main mutual obligations of
the parties consist of the transfer of goods for payment is unani-
mously characterized as a sales contract. The CISG then has
potential applicability. If the CISG achieves acceptance as a
"world sales code," then its application to international software
contracts would result in certainty as to the applicable law.
Moreover, the CISG provides a set of rules in six languages
that are not only modern, but closely adhere to the needs of in-
ternational trade. These rules provide an ideal compromise,
and an alternative to interpreting contracts using only one
party's local or domestic law. Furthermore, with the simplified,
clear norms of the CISG governing the contract, there is no dan-
ger of a "parachute drop into darkness" as often happens when
parties choose the unknown law of a third country as a neutral
compromise. Also, the applicability of the CISG diminishes con-
tractual difficulties arising over the choice of subsidiary applica-
ble law.1
Nevertheless, it remains questionable whether software
can be regarded as a "good" under the CISG. This leads to
problems with interpreting the CISG according to its preamble
and Article 7(1) that requires an autonomous uniform interpre-
tation.1 2 This article will discuss the applicability of the CISG
to software contracts and will address the problems involved in
maintaining uniformity among contracting states in interna-
tional sales law.
9 A contract of sale is "a contract by which one of the contracting parties,
called the "seller," enters into an obligation to the other to cause him to have
freely, by a title of proprietor, a thing, for the price of a certain sum of money,
which the other contracting party, called the "buyer," on his part obliges himself to
pay. BLAcKs LAW DIcTIoNARY 326 (6th ed. 1990).
10 Kegel discusses the theory that recognizes the different methods of classifi-
cation in other systems of law. Such methods seek an intermediate solution
thereby avoiding a lex fori solution. See KEGEL, supra note 1, at 251-53.
11 The acceleration of entering into a contract because of the opportunity to
choose the CISG as a neutral compromise is also expressly mentioned as an advan-
tage and goal in the Secretariat's Commentary to the "New York Draft of 1978."
See HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE UNIFORM LAw FOR INTERNATIONAL
SALES 404, 405 (1989).
12 CISG, supra note 2, at art. 7(1).
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II. GENERAL PREREQUISITES OF APPLICATION
Before addressing the question of whether contracts for the
transfer of software fall within the sphere of application of the
CISG, the following section will address the general sphere of
application of the CISG.
A. Spatial Prerequisites for Application: The Internationality
of Sales Contracts
The spatial application of the CISG described in article 113
is determined either autonomously or with the help of the non-
unified rules of private international law of the forum state. In
each case, an objective, international element is required. 14 In
an autonomous determination of the spatial application under
article 1(a), 15 the parties must have their place of business or
habitual residence, as defined in article 10(b), 16 in different
states at the time of entering into the sales contract.17 Alterna-
tively, the CISG spatially applies according to article 1(b) if the
non-unified rules of private international law require the law of
a contracting state to govern the contract.' 8 This presupposes
that such state has not excluded an expanded sphere of applica-
tion by reservation under article 95;19 even if the CISG applies,
the parties to the contract can choose the applicable law.20 The
allowance stems from the universally recognized principle of
party autonomy under non-unified private international law,
13 CISG, supra note 2, at art. 1.
14 CISG, supra note 2, at art. 1.
15 CISG, supra note 2, at art. 1(a).
16 CISG, supra note 2, at art. 10(b).
17 CISG, supra note 2, at art. 1(b).
18 CISG, supra note 2, at art. 1(b).
19 Such a reservation under the Convention has been made by China, the for-
mer CSFR and the U.S. Along with its ratification, the Federal Republic of Ger-
many has made a partial reservation that is not provided for in the Convention
itself. This reservation states that the CISG may not be applied if the rules of
private international law, according to article 1(b) of the application of the law of a
contracting state, made the reservation under article 95. See REINHART, UN-
KAuFEcHT (1991); CISG supra note 2, at art. 1. Nevertheless, Herber and
Czerwenka, regard this partial reservation only as a nonbinding rule for interpre-
tation, since is is unclear whether such a reservation is valid under public interna-
tional law. One should not forget that this partial reservation is just a "minus" in
comparison to the complete reservation made possible by article 95 and therefore
may not be admissible. See HERBER & CZERWENKA, supra note 2.
20 CISG, supra note 2, at art. 95.
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and in turn results in the supremacy of the parties' choice of
law.2 1
Accordingly, under article 6,22 parties can derogate from
the CISG but the parties have to state such a derogation explic-
itly and precisely because of the wide sphere of application de-
scribed in article 1(b). 23 The "international legislator," i.e., the
members of the 1980 Diplomatic Conference in Vienna, refused
in contrast to the members of the 1964 Hague Sales Conven-
tions, to add a cumulative, objective, trans-border element.24
Such an objective international element may have included con-
tractual formation from two different states, or the actual
export of goods for achieving a wide spatial sphere of
application.25
B. Personal Prerequisites of Application
Generally, the CISG does not differentiate between
merchants and other persons.26 According to article 2(a), only
contracts for the sale of goods intended for the personal use of
the seller are excluded. 27 The status of the parties is deter-
mined at the conclusion of the contract by objective standards. 28
This exception applies based on the intended use in a particular
case, (a subjective approach), and not because of any personal
characteristics of the parties.29 If a private person sells goods to
21 Specifically, the "Cg]eneral principle of law recognized by civilized nations."
See VON BAR, INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT VOL. 2, 412 (1991); with regard to
English private international law, this basic rule can be found in Gienar v. Meyer
2 Hy BI 603 (1796); see also, CHESIRE & NORTH, PRrVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw 476
(12th ed.). 1992).
22 CISG, supra note 2, at art. 6.
23 As to the prerequisite wording for a proper derogation or derivative clause,
and its intrinsic difficulties, see V.KAS, ZUM PERSONLICHEN UND RAMLICHEN
ANUWENDUNGSBEREICH DES UN-EINHErrSKAUFRECHTS, IPRax 342, 346 (1987).
24 See generally CISG supra note 2.
25 See CZERWENKA, RECHTSANWENDUNGSPROBLEME IM INTERNATIONALEN
KAUFRECHT 129 (1988); VON CAEMMERER & SCHLECHTRIEM-HERBER, supra note 1,
at art. 1, nos. 3, 7; HERBER & CZERWENKA, supra note 2, at art. 1, no. 9.
26 The problem of an international, uniform classification of a person as a
"merchant," i.e., professional salesperson, was deliberately avoided. See Vkds,
supra note 24, at 342.
27 Specifically, "personal, family or household use." CISG supra note 2, at art.
2(a).
28 CISG, supra note 2, at art. 6.
29 See CZERWENKA, supra note 26, at 128. See also VON CAEMMERER &
SCHLECHTRIEM-HERBER, supra note 26 at art. 2, nos. 5, 9.
1996]
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a merchant or to another private person for resale the CISG
then becomes applicable. For CISG applicability to interna-
tional software contracts, the Convention's substantive sphere
of application is most decisive.
C. Substantive Prerequisites of Application
Article 1(1) of the CISG explicitly limits the scope of the
Convention's substantive application to contracts for the sale of
goods. 30 However, no definition can be found in the CISG for
either the essential elements of a sales contract, or for its main
objects, namely, the "goods/marchandises" (the German
Waren). Nevertheless, it is possible indirectly to extract the
central elements of the sales contract from two of the Conven-
tion's norms.
According to article 30, the seller's main obligation is to de-
liver and transfer property in the goods, including all relevant
documents.3 1 The buyer's main obligation under the sales con-
tract is stated in article 53 and consists of tendering payment
and taking delivery of the goods. 32 Any transaction may be sub-
sumed under the notion of a sales contract if the mutual obliga-
tions of the parties consist on the one hand, of the delivery of
goods, including the transfer of property in them, and on the
other hand, the payment of the price for the goods. 33
A legal definition of "goods," however, cannot be indirectly
inferred from a systematic reference to the wording of other
30 CISG, supra note 2, at art. 1.
31 CISG, supra note 2, at art. 30.
32 CISG, supra note 2, at art. 53.
33 This definition of a sales contract is also consistent with the ideas of the
UNCITRAL Working Group of 1970. See HONNOLD, supra note 12, at 63. Interest-
ingly, the buyer's obligation to take delivery of the goods amounts under article 53
amounts to a main contractual obligation whereas under § 433 1 BGB, it is only an
ancillary obligation which creates unnecessary problems as to the correct contrac-
tual remedy under German domestic sales law if the buyer fails or refuses to take
delivery. It is nevertheless unclear and unsettled whether a sales contract accord-
ing to the CISG presupposes the payment of the price in money or whether it could
be paid at least in part by barter. It should be safe to conclude from the Conven-
tion's main objective to support international trade by a set of uncomplicated uni-
form norms, that the forms of payment are deliberately and entirely left to the
parties' discretion as being part of their basic freedom of contract-party autonomy.
See HERBER & CZERWENKA, supra note 2 at art. 53, nos. 9, 10 SCHLECHTRIEM, UNI-
FORM SALES LAW 26 (1986); HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES
UNDER THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION 102, 103 (2nd ed. 1991).
[Vol. 8:303
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norms of the Convention, since "goods/marchandises" is a basic
term of the CISG that was originally created by the interna-
tional legislator. 34 A precise characterization of software and
international software contracts requires an exact definition
and distinction of that basic term since it is unclear whether
article 1 also includes intangible movable things. According to
the internal law of most of the contracting states to the Conven-
tion, computer software is categorized as an intangible, incorpo-
real thing.35 Due to its specific features, computer software
does not automatically fit into the traditional categories of con-
tract law that distinguish not only between tangible and intan-
gible things, but also between contracts for the sale and supply
of services.36
There have been few attempts to find a proper definition for
the term "goods/merchandises."37 Such attempts have lacked
the required autonomous method of interpretation 38 that com-
plies dogmatically with the postulate in article 7.39
34 See generally CISG, supra note 2.
35 Incorporeal is defined as "without body. Not of material nature" and incor-
poreal property is "in the civil law, that which consists in legal right merely."
BLAces LAw DICTIONARY 767 (6th ed. 1990).
36 For a discussion of this issue under German contract law, see JUNKER, COM-
PuTERREcwr 48 (1988); Mehrings, Computersoftware und Gewdhrleistungsrecht,
NJW 1904 (1986); under U.S. contract law, see Horovitz, Note, Computer Software
as a Good under the Uniform Commercial Code: Taking a Byte out of the Intangi-
bility Myth, 65 B.U. L.REv. 129, 132 (1985); Durney, Note, The Warranty of
Merchantibility and Computer Software Contracts: A Square Peg Won't Fit in a
Round Hole, 59 WASH. L.R. 511 (1984); for a discussion under English contract
law, see Kirk, Software of Merchantible Quality? CL & P 225 (1991); Smith,
Software Contracts, COMPUTER LAw 35, 36 (1990); Diedrich, Computersoftware im
Geflecht des englischen Vertragsrechts, CR 459 (1995). For a discussion of this
issue under Australian contract law, see Cavanagh, The Supply of Computer
Software, Goods or Services, A.B.L.R. 12, 195 (1984).
37 Goods, Wares and Merchandise is "a general and comprehensive designa-
tion of such chattels and goods as are ordinarily subject to traffic and sale."
BLAcKs's LAW DICTIONARY 694 (6th ed. 1990).
35 This method of interpretation is required by the CISG, supra note 2, at art.
1.
39 CISG, supra note 2, at art. 7.
1996] 309
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III. THE METHODOLOGY FOR AN AUTONOMOUS
INTERPRETATION OF INTERNATIONAL UNIFORM LAW
UNDER THE CISG
The international origin of the CISG and the fact that the
"international legislator" attempted to find autonomous, origi-
nal terms without using a single system of laws or legal termi-
nology makes an autonomous method of interpretation
necessary. The text of the CISG consists of unique, suprana-
tional collective terms formed out of compromises between state
delegates based on several systems of laws.40 The dogmatic re-
sult is the necessity to avoid the use of traditional methods of
domestic law in interpreting internal statutes or codes. These
methods either violate the specific dogmatic features of interna-
tional uniform law to which the CISG belongs, or use restrictive
bases for interpreting statutes that make them unsuitable.4 1
The policy behind the interpretation required by article 7(1)
thus becomes clearer when examined against the international
character of the Convention that emphasizes the necessity of
promoting uniformity in its application of law, and the obser-
vance of good faith in international commerce. Although article
7(1) requires an autonomous interpretation independent of do-
mestic law, it fails to prescribe a method for achieving such an
international uniform and automous interpretation. 42
The basic or general ratio conventionis of international uni-
form law, the creation of supranational, uniform statutory rules
between contracting states that support stability and predict-
ability in international legal relationships is not fostered by re-
strictive or "homeward" methods of interpretation. The
postulate for putting this basic ratio conventionis into effect can
be found in the preamble and article 7(1) of the CISG.43
40 See Kahn, La convention de Vienne du 11 avril 1980 sur les contrats de
vente internationale de marchandises, 33 REv. INT. DR. COMP. 951, 956, 957 (1981).
41 For a discussion of the English "literal rule," see MAXWELL, THE INTERPRE-
TATION OF STATUTES 28 (12th ed. 1980); Heydon's Case, 3 Co. Rep. 7a (1584); and
Mann, The Interpretation of Uniform Statutes, 62 LQR 278 (1946)(criticizing the
rule because of the unsuitable results when interpreting international uniform
law).
42 See Ferrari, Uniform Interpretation of the 1980 Uniform Sales Law, 24 GA.
J. INT'L. & CoMp. L. 183, 200 (1994).
43 CISG, supra note 2, at art. 7.
310 [Vol. 8:303
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Given the supranational character of the CISG, it is safe to
conclude that article 7 calls for an original, autonomous method
of interpretation as a matter of law. This conclusion concurs
with international scholarly writings in which most authors
hold that article 7 requires a departure from those methods of
interpretation that focus unilaterally on one system of law.
This is especially true of the traditional English common law
interpretation that is particularly unsuitable because of its lit-
eral rule as a dogmatic basis.44 These rules are tailored solely
for the interpretation of statutes that have their roots in the
common law.4 5
International uniform law has its origin neither substan-
tively nor methodically in the common law system and ordina-
rily follows in its structure the codes and statutes from civil law
countries. Additionally, the common law methods of interpret-
ing statutes subliminally and silently presuppose the
supremacy of judge-made law that inevitably, on the basis of
the literal rule, results in an interpretation of statutes that is as
restrictive as possible.46
" See generally Mann, supra note 42.
45 See Mann, supra note 42, at 278; Bayer, Auslegung und Erganzung interna-
tional vereinheitlichter Normen durch staatliche Gerichte, 20 RabelsZ 603, 604-5
(1955). The "hostile" attitude of the English common law toward statutory law
becomes clear if one examines the "mischief rule," which supplements the literal
rule. It provides that a proper interpretation can be found by comparing the com-
mon law as it stood before the enactment with the rules laid down in the statute
itself. This comparison is without regard to the real intention of the legislature by
means of a historical interpretation; see BENNION, STATUTE LAW 89 (2d ed. 1983).
U.S. law takes a much more liberal approach toward statutory interpretation in
general with a historical interpretation as a normal method even though the Eng-
lish methods of interpretation were adopted in the United States as part of the
common law; see SUTHERLAND, 2 STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, 333 (3d
ed. 1943); FARNSWORTH, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE UNITED
STATES 67 (1983). Nevertheless, there is a trend in the United States against the
restrictive historical interpretation because of the inherent danger of procrustat-
ing the law; see, e.g., Slawson, Legislative History and the Need to Bring Statutory
Interpretation Under the Rule of Law, 44 STAN. L.REv. 383, 424, 425 (1992).
46 See FIKENSCHER, METHODEN DES RECHTS, BAND II, ANGLO-AMERIKANISCHER
RECHTSKREis, 112 (1975). This author compares the relationship between statu-
tory and judge-made law in England with a game in which the judges regard stat-
utes as intruders and therefore interpret them as narrowly as possible until the
legislature ends the game by enacting a new or more precise statute. However,
since the House of Lords decision in Fothergill v. Monarch Airlines Ltd. 2 All E.R.
696 (1980), a fundamental change has occurred in England in favor of a more lib-
1996]
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In contrast, the traditional canon for statutory interpreta-
tion of the civil law systems of continental Europe that dates
from Roman law47 is flexible enough to adapt itself to the spe-
cial features of any statute of any origin and may be supple-
mented according to the legislator's particular intentions or
goals. As a result, the EEC Court of Justice (EuGH) applies
this traditional canon of interpretation as a basis for interpret-
ing the EEC treaties. Additionally, the European Community
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments
in Civil and Commercial Matters (Brussels Convention/EuGVii)
has its own specifically developed autonomous method of
interpretation. 48
The term "autonomous interpretation" does not imply a
completely new, revolutionary method, but rather a suprana-
tional synthesis combining single methods that form a new ca-
non of interpretation. This can be called the "interpretation-
ladder." For the purpose of International Uniform Law, "auton-
omous interpretation" stands for a synthesis of methods based
on the traditional civil-law canon since this canon is flexible
enough to adapt itself to any statute. For the purposes of inter-
national uniform law, the traditional grammatical, systematic
and historical method of interpretation must be supplemented
by a comparative method.
Although the latter method of interpretation does not refer
to a comparison of domestic laws at first, the desired uniformity
can only be achieved if judgments and scholarly writings on the
particular uniform law from other contracting states are consid-
ered. Without any binding power, judgments from other con-
tracting states can only have persuasive authority. Only if no
conflicting judgments or scholarly writings can be found, a
"true" comparison of domestic laws is admissible as ultima ra-
eral interpretation of international uniform law that has also had consequences for
the interpretation of pure internal English statutes.
47 For a discussion of the Roman origin of this canon in interpreting statutes,
see VON SAVIGNY, SYSTEM DES HEUTIGEN ROMISCHEN RECHTS 1 296 (1971)(1840); see
also, Rabel, Rechsvergleichung und internationale Rechtsprechung, 1 RABELZ 5, 21,
22 (1927).
48 As to the autonomous method concerning the EuGVU, see KROPHOLLER,
EuROPAISCHEs ZIVILPROZEPRECHT, KOMMENTAR ZUM EuGVo, 31 (4th ed. 1993); and
as to the EEC treaties, see BEUTLER, BIEBER, PIPKORN & STREIL, DIE EUROPAISCHE
UNION - RECHrrORDNUNG UND POLITIK No. 7.2.4.1. (4th ed. 1993); and PIEPER &
SCHOLLMEIER, EUROPARECHT, 40 (1991).
[Vol. 8:303312
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tio. In this way, an autonomous, supranational interpretation
can be found through a compromise that does not favor the con-
cept of a single legal system (lex fori). Any comparison with do-
mestic laws must be examined closely since it stands in contrast
to the supranational, autonomous character of international
uniform law and puts its uniform interpretation generally at
risk.49 Additionally, an autonomous interpretation, must at the
end, always examine the preamble of the convention in question
since the preamble reveals the more precise legislative goals
apart from achieving uniform law among the contracting states.
The "interpretation-ladder" described above is suitable to
serve as a model to be adopted by all Contracting States for a
proper, methodical approach in obtaining a uniform, autono-
mous interpretation of the CIGS pursuant to article 7.50 Such
uniformity of interpretation could perhaps even make an "inter-
national supreme court" superfluous if the Contracting States
would provide each other with information or access to all rele-
vant judgments and scholarly writings.
One may ask why the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties and its rules on the interpretation of treaties has not
been mentioned. 51 The Vienna Convention is only concerned
with the obligations of contracting states to each other under
public international law. Such obligations are also created by
the CISG and centered in Part IV - Final Provisions, articles
89 to 101 of the CISG. Part IV contains procedures for adher-
ence, rules governing denunciation of the convention and the
main obligations that give legal effect to the rules on interna-
49 See Ferrari, supra note 43, at 209 (suggesting that the concept of foreign
law should only be admissible where legislative history or the Convention itself
reveals that the drafters had a peculiar concept in the domestic law of a specific
legal system). This approach certainly gives respect to the unique and suprana-
tional character of the theoretical concepts of the CISG. However, it is very un-
likely to find a reference in the tr~vaux pr6paratories which describes how the
majority of participants in the Conference referred to a legal concept from a single
domestic law. Furthermore, such a restricted use of a "true" comparison of domes-
tic laws bars a supranational interpretation that tries to strike at least a balance
between different concepts under the domestic laws of the contracting states.
Even in difficult cases, there is the fair chance that the outcome of an interpreta-
tion does not stem from the lex fori or just another single system of laws if the
described "interpretation ladder" is applied.
50 CISG, supra note 2, at art. 7.
51 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 22, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.39/27, reprinted in 289 I.L.M. 679 (1969) [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
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tional sales set forth in articles 1 through 88.52 As such, the
Vienna Convention applies to Part IV of the CISG.
In contrast, most of the provisions of the CISG articles 1
through 88 address the parties to a contract for the sale of goods
and not the obligations of States.53 These obligations arising
out of private contracts are governed by specific rules of inter-
pretation as stated in article 7(1).54 It is evident then, that the
contracting states to the CISG expressly deviated from the in-
terpretation principles enunciated in the 1969 Vienna Conven-
tion.55 Additionally, the Vienna Convention states that
interpretation principles are rigid and therefore only applicable
to state obligations. 56 In contrast, article 6 gives the parties the
freedom to derogate from any of the CISG's provisions and arti-
cle 11 allows parties to contract orally. 57 This flexibility calls
for an equally flexible method for interpreting the obligations of
parties, as already stated in article 7, to give full effect to the
convention's general rules and purposes.58
Nevertheless, a separate problem with interpreting Inter-
national Uniform law consists of the initial categorization of a
term as "unclear." In such a situation, every lawyer unavoid-
ably applies and interprets international uniform law by using
his or her "home law." This approach is problematic in that
there may be objectively justified doubts of a "reasonable supra-
national bystander's" proper interpretation of a term in the
Convention, whereas the meaning is well-defined under a given
"home law." Such an interpretation could lead to a nationalistic
approach favoring the lex fori, even if an autonomous method of
interpretation is being used.5 9 This fear is further supported by
the internationally accepted maxim for interpreting private law
52 See generally CISG, supra note 2.
53 See generally CISG, supra note 2.
54 CISG, supra note 2, at art. 7.
55 Vienna Convention, supra note 53.
56 See HONNOLD, supra note 34, at 158-159. See also CISG, supra note 2, at
art. 7.
57 CISG, supra note 2, at art. 6.
58 See HONNOLD, supra note 34, at 158-159; See also CISG, supra note 2, at
art. 7.
59 For reservations concerning uniform interpretation of the law, see Hein
Katz, RechtsvereinheitlIchung: Nutzen, Methoden, Ziele, 50 RABELZ 1, 8 (1986). See
also Rabel, supra note 49, at 5, 20.
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statutes, in claris non fit interpretatio.60 This stems from the
supremacy of the legislature and forbids any interpretation of a
statute's clear and unambiguous text. Although this maxim
originated from Roman Law, it is also valid in common-law
countries, despite the fact that there was never such a reception
of Roman law in common-law countries as there was in the
civil-law countries of continental Europe.61 Under French law,
this maxim is called the acte claire-doctrine.62 Under English
law, it forms part of the "literal rule"63 and the U.S. equivalent
is the "plain meaning rule."64
The ban on interpreting clear and unambiguous statutes
results from the text's legislature order to enforce the statute as
it stands. This order has to be enforced by the courts because of
the legislature's prerogative in making law. The rules inter-
preting any statute according to the objective will of the legisla-
ture can be found in the principle of separation of powers:
Under German law it can be found in article 20 III, 97 I GG,65
and under English law it can be found in the "Doctrine of Par-
liamentary Sovereignty."66 In any case, the marking or catego-
rizing of a term as unambiguous is already the result of an
"unnoticed" interpretation process. Therefore, such an inter-
pretation is tempting to a lawyer since he or she is then auto-
60 Roberta Kevelson, Symposium: Semiotics, Dialectic, and the Law: Semiotics
and Methods of Legal Inquiry: Interpretation and Discovery in Law from the Per-
spective of Pierce's Speculative Rhetoric, 61 IND. L.J. 355, 363 (1986).
61 As to the reception of this maxim under German law, see NJW 1553 (BGH
1956); MuNcHFEmi KOMMENTAR-SACKER, BGB, 1 Band, Einl. No. 96, 97 (2nd ed.
1984); For the reception under English law, see MAXWELL, supra note 42, at 29.
For the reception under U.S. law, see SUTHERLAND, supra note 47, at 334-36, 414.
The origin of this maxim is found in the Dig. 32.25.1 (Paulus, L. 25D.32): "Cum in
verbis nulla ambiguitas est, non debet admitti voluntatis quaestio .... "
62 French courts use this maxim as a means to evade their former duty to
submit on clear terms of European Law according to article 177 of the EWGV as
applied to the EuGH with its monopoly on interpretation. For a discussion of arti-
cle 177 see H. VON DER GROEBEN, H. VON BOECKH, J. THIESING & C.D. EHLERMANN,
KOMMENTAR zuM EWG-VERTRAG, 42 (1983).
63 See BENNION, supra note 47, at 334-36; see also FARNSWORTH, supra note
47, at 67.
64 See SUTHERLAND, supra note 47, at 334-36; see also FARNSWORTH, supra
note 54, at 47.
65 See 34 BVerfGE 269; MUNCHENER, supra note 63, at Einl. no. 66; See also
Canaris, Die Bedeutung allgeneiner Auslegungs-und Rechtsfortbildungskriterien
im Wechselrecht, JURISTEN ZEITUNG [JZ] 543, 544 (1987).
66 See COLIN TURPIN. BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND THE CONSTITUTION 22 (1985).
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matically relieved from doing an objectively required
autonomous interpretation. 67
With this taken into consideration, the international law-
yer must be careful with his or her interpretation of "officially
clear and unambiguous terms" in International Uniform Law
because those terms consist of unique rules based on compro-
mise between various systems of law.68 A lawyer's incorrect in-
terpretation of international uniform law, to achieve fast
results, is particularly possible if it is based on principles with
which the lawyer is most familiar with, namely, his or her
"home law." Such an interpretation would be in noncompliance
with the supranational goals of the Convention.
Additionally, when interpreting multilingual conventions,
there is an issue as to which language of the text is authentic, 69
since the starting point for any statutory interpretation is logi-
cally the wording of the statute itself. This wording represents
the direct, "frozen" will of the legislature and must be followed
by all courts by virtue of its supremacy under the separation of
powers. Although multilingual conventions support their own
international acceptance, and present valuable advantages for
parties from different countries that enter a contract, there is
also the side-effect of a vast amount of possible interpreta-
tions. 70 A stringent presumption exists in favor of that text
which an "international legislator" declared authentic as a rep-
resentation of the legislator's actual will concerning the gram-
matical meaning of the text's wording. All texts that are not
authentic are excluded from an autonomous interpretation.
The only texts that have become binding on the court by way of
67 For a discussion of this problem under German domestic law, see
MONCHENER, supra note 63, at Einl. no. 96, 97. Categorizing a statutory term as
clear and unambiguous can only have the meaning that a corresponding practice
in interpretation has already established.
68 As to the many difficult compromises among the representatives of con-
tracting states that finally led to the ratified text of the CISG, see Alejandro M.
Garro, Reconciliation of Legal Traditions in the U.N. Convention on Contracts for
the International Sale of Goods, 23 INT'L LAw. 443 (1989).
69 See Hans Dalle, Zur Problematik Mehrsprachiger Gesetzes-und Vertrag-
stexte, 26 RABELZ 4, 24, 27 (1961).
70 The ideal case in promulgating future conventions would be an agreement
among the contracting states to have one single, authentic text. This would not
support the parties by supplying a text in their native language, but instead would
provide fewer possibilities for interpretation and thus establish stability and
predictability.
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a ratification of the Convention are those that were declared au-
thentic by the "international legislator." An "official" transla-
tion of a multilingual convention into a non-authentic language
contains only a prima facie presumption of its correctness: It
still requires an examination and comparison to the authentic
text(s).,1
This absolute supremacy of the authentic text of a ratified
Convention under German law, can be found in article 3 II 1
EGBGB, since the non-authentic translation is only a part of
the national rules of German conflicts law and the original ver-
sion of any ratified convention prevails over them. 72
If there are several, equally authentic texts of a multil-
ingual convention, it is questionable for an autonomous inter-
pretation to let some languages prevail over others simply
because of practical reasons as with the CISG, where there are
as many as six languages involved.73 As the "international leg-
islator" declares, since all these languages are equally authen-
tic, no language may prevail. A lawyer must find the accurate
text ("texte juste") by comparing them all.
If such a comparison reveals disparities between the au-
thentic texts that cannot be rectified, then the interpretation
rule in article 33 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties has to be applied which provides that the real or nor-
mative intention of the final diplomatic conference is decisive. 74
The intention of the international legislator in the final diplo-
matic conference can be found by way of a historical interpreta-
tion of the trdvaux prdparatories.7 5 Such an analysis reveals
that concerning the CISG, the official but non-authentic Ger-
man translation that was jointly drafted by Austria, the Federal
71 See VON CAEMMERER & SCHLECHTRIEM-HERBER, supra note 26 art. 1, no. 3,
7; See also CISG, supra note 2, at art. 1 (involving the official German translation
of the CISG).
72 "EGBGB" is an abbreviation for Einfiihrungsgesetz zum BUrgerlichen
Gesetzbuch, or Introductory Law to the Civil Code. 12 J.L. & COM. 261, 263
(1993). For a discussion of the strict interpretation of Art. 3 Sec. II Sentence 1 of
the EGBGB, see Jiirgen Basedow, Die Neuregelung des Internationalen Privat-und
Prozessrechts, NJW, 2971, 2975 (1988) and JAN KROPHOLLER, INTERNATIONALES
PRIVATRECHT 54 (2d ed., 1994).
73 CISG, supra note 2.
74 See the Vienna Convention, supra note 53, at art. 33.
75 "Trdvaux Pr~paratoires" is a term of art that refers to the preparatory work
of treaty formation. See generally, supra note 53.
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Republic of Germany, the former German Democratic Republic
and Switzerland has to be ruled out as the basis for an autono-
mous interpretation. As such, it is reasonable to examine the
English and French texts of the CISG to find a texte juste, be-
cause these were the languages in which the deliberations and
legal negotiations among the representatives of the Contracting
States took place.
It can be presumed then, that the English and French texts
of the CISG best represent the intentions of the representatives
at the 1980 Diplomatic Conference in Vienna as to the exact
wording of the Convention's final text.76 The authentic English
and French texts of the CISG form the basis for the autonomous
interpretation and definition of the term "goods/marchandises"
in article 1(1). 7 7
IV. AUTONOMOUS INTERPRETATION AND DEFINITION OF THE
TERM "GOODS/MARCHANDISES" IN ARTICLE 1 OF THE CISG
A. Grammatical and Systematic Interpretation
It is not possible to determine from the isolated English or
French texts of article 1 whether the substantive sphere of ap-
plication includes intangible things.78 The translation of "mar-
chandises" only refers to "movable goods" or "freight" without
giving any hint whether incorporeal, intangible, computer
software can be subsumed under this wording. Furthermore,
the term "marchandises" in contrast to the corresponding term
objects corporels mobiliers in the Hague Sales Convention, is
lacking a technical meaning under French domestic law.79
Although this could have served as a clue, the term "mar-
76 One German author pointed out that the negotiations within the drafting
committee of the 1980 Diplomatic Conference were exclusively done in English and
that, therefore, in cases of doubt, the English text should prevail. See VON CAEM-
MERER & SCHLECHTRIEM-HERBER, supra note 26 art. 7, no. 22; See also CISG, supra
note 2, at art 7. and Ulrich Magnus, Das UN-Kaufrecht tritt in Kraft, 51 RABELZ
123, 128 (1987) (underlying the practical importance of the English version of the
CISG because of the many legal similarities it has with the legal terminology of
common-law countries).
77 CISG, supra note 2, at art. 1.
78 CISG, supra note 2, at art. 1.
79 Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods,
July 1, 1964, U.N.T.S. 107 (1972); Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the
Formation of Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, July 1, 1964, 834
U.N.T.S. 169 (1972) [hereinafter "Hague Sales Convention"].
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chandises" originates from French trade usage.8 0 This is a
striking example of the autonomous terms of the CISG that
should not have been connected with the well-known technical
meanings of one system of law."' In a grammatical interpreta-
tion of the term "goods/marchandises," the first step of the "in-
terpretation-ladder" fails. The second step, i.e., the systematic
comparison with other norms within the CISG does not reveal
whether this term includes intangible things.
It may be inferred that because one intangible thing is ex-
cluded from the Convention's sphere of application, i.e., electric-
ity, in article 2(e), then, all intangible things are excluded
because electricity simply serves as an example. Such a thesis
can be easily disproved by a short analysis of the trdvaux
prdparatories of article 2(e). The exclusion of electricity from
the Convention's substantive sphere of application was origi-
nally initiated by the UNCITRAL Working Group and later
adopted by UNCITRAL at its tenth session in 1977 to prevent
different categorizations of contracts for transfer of electricity.8 2
It was then predictable that because of the different categoriza-
tions of electricity as possible objects of a contract for the sale of
goods under the domestic laws of the participating states, with-
out such an explicit exclusion, conflicts between the domestic
law and the categorization of this intangible thing under the
later Convention would have inevitably occurred.
It is possible to compare the CISG to the equivalent norms
of the Convention's predecessor, the Hague Sales Convention of
1964, since the CISG was drafted based on the Hague Conven-
tion.83 One could call it a revised version of the 1964 Hague
Sales Convention.8 4 Such a comparison also includes all the in-
ternationally available judgments and scholarly writings. It
must be stressed that under an autonomous interpretation of
80 See Kahn, Convention de Vienne du 11 Avril 1980 Caract~res et domaine
d'application, D.P.C.I. 385, 390 (1989).
81 The change in the wording of the French text of the CISG in contrast to the
text of the Hague Sales Convention was also intentional. See Kahn, supra note 41,
at 951, 956, 957.
82 For a historical discussion, see UNCITRAL-yb XIII (1977) at 27; see also
HONNOLD, supra note 12, at 320. (This same reasoning appears in the Secretariat's
Commentary on the 1977 New York Draft) HONNOLD, supra note 12, at 404, 406.
83 Hague Sales Convention, supra note 81.
84 Hague Sales Convention, supra note 81.
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international uniform law, a systematic comparison with other
conventions is, in general, dogmatically inadmissible because of
two reasons: First, there is no international uniform law tradi-
tion that could serve as justification for the principle of legal
unity within one system of law that presupposes a methodical
and dogmatic consistency of its laws. Second, the goals of each
convention are usually divergent, as with special statutes for
particular issues under domestic law. In principle, each con-
vention consists of a small system of law by itself whose specific
character as an autonomous body of law is maintained even af-
ter its incorporation via ratification into national law. More-
over, the international legislator is generally not identical so
that it would be highly questionable to transplant definitions or
legal maxims from one convention to another unless these were
explicitly or obviously adopted by the international legislator
with the same specific meaning for the convention in question.8 5
In the authentic English text of the Hague Sales Conven-
tion under article 1, the object of the international sales con-
tract was also called by the term "goods." 6 In contrast, the
French text used the term objects corporels mobiliersY'7 The lat-
ter term corresponds to an identical term under French domes-
tic law where it describes clearly and unambiguously tangible
movables. 88 Nevertheless, it has been stressed, from the
French point of view, that the state representatives at the 1980
Diplomatic conference in Vienna did not intend to change the
meaning of that term by changing the wording in the French
text. 9 This suggests that a grammatical and systematic inter-
pretation of the CISG would be too vague and unproductive for
85 For a divergent opinion see KROPHOLLER, supra note 50, at 34. This author
argues that any international uniform law for the E.C. member states based upon
secondary EEC law (regulations and directions) may be systematically compared
to one another. This is questionable, since generally, the legislature's goals of each
convention still remains different.
86 Hague Sales Convention, supra note 81, at art. 1.
87 The only equally authentic English and French text of the Hague Sales
Convention can be found in II BGBL 886 (1973). See also HANs DOLLE, KOM-
MENTAR ZtJM EINHEITLICHEN KAUFRECHT (1976) and R. GRAVESON, E. COHN & D.
GRAVEsON, THE UNIFORM LAWS ON INTERNATIONAL SALES ACT, 1967: A COMMEN-
TARY (1968).
88 See Kahn, supra note 41. The non-authentic, official German translation
"bewegliche korperliche Sachen" also followed this clear French wording identi-
cally; see DOLLE, supra note 91, at 8.
89 See Kahn, supra note 41, at 956.
[Vol. 8:303
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol8/iss2/2
SOFTWARE CONTRACTS AND THE CISG
finding a proper, autonomous definition of the term "goods/mar-
chandises" with special reference to intangible things such as
computer software.
B. Historical Interpretation
The original intentions of the "international legislator" are
also binding on the courts of the Contracting States because
these legislative intentions were transformed into applicable
law by way of the legislative ratification of the Convention. The
analysis of the officially published trdvaux prdparatoires for re-
trieving the actual intention of the "international legislator"
concerning the characteristics or composition of the "goods/mar-
chandises" in article 1 does not reveal any further hint for a
certain, autonomous, definition according to the "international
legislator's" intention.90 The term "goods/marchandises" was
not subject to any form of criticism at the UNCITRAL Working
Group, 91 which has been engaged in drafting a reform conven-
tion based on the Hague Sales Convention.92 Nor is such an
intention revealed from the negotiations of the entire UNCI-
TRAL from 1977 to 1978, 93 or the final diplomatic conference in
Vienna in 1980. Furthermore, at the Vienna conference, there
were no talks concerning the categorization of intangible mov-
ables or computer software as possible objects of the future con-
vention outside the official negotiations.94 Other additional,
unofficially published materials do not exist. Apart from this,
unofficially published trdvaux prdparatoires do not play any sig-
nificant role in the historical interpretation of international uni-
form law since its main goal is to find under the framework of
an autonomous interpretation, the actual intentions of the in-
ternational legislature based upon at least a majority vote.
90 See CISG, supra note 2, at art. 1.
91 UNCITRAL-Yb I 177 (1968-70); see also HONNOLD, supra note 12, at 15.
92 UNCITRAL-Yb XIII 27 (1977); see also HONNOLD, supra note 12, at 320.
93 See Negotiations of the First Committee, Official Records, UNCITRAL-Yb
238 (1968-70) and Protocol of the Plenary Meeting, Official Records I UNCITRAL-
Yb 200, 201 (1968-70); see also HONNOLD, supra note 12, at 459, 735, 736.
94 Otherwise, Schlechtriem's conjectures concerning the categorization of
computer software under the CISG would not make much sense since he person-
ally participated in the 1980 Vienna conference as a member of the German (FRG)
delegation. See Peter Schlechtriem, Uniform Sales Law - The Experience with
Uniform Sales Law in the Federal Republic of Germany, 3 JURIDISK TDSKRIFT 1, 18
(1991-1992).
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This is hardly the case with unpublished trAvaux pr6paratoires.
Thus, a historical interpretation of the term "goods/mar-
chandises" in article 1(1), within an autonomous interpretation
proves to be unproductive regarding intangible things and com-
puter software.
C. Considering the Judgments and Scholarly Writings in
Contracting States
In achieving an international uniform interpretation of the
CISG, an analysis must be made regarding judgments and
scholarly writings on the Convention in the contracting states.
Foreign judgments have dogmatically been given the power of
"persuasive authorities" similar to judgments among common-
law countries, especially within the former Commonwealth
countries. This means that these judgments constitute an addi-
tional reservoir of arguments and possible solutions in the deci-
sion making process. 95 Such foreign judgments cannot have the
binding force of "binding precedents," since there is no such in-
ternationally binding rule and because German courts are by
virtue of article 20 III GG, directly bound only by statutes
passed or ratified by the German legislature and not by earlier
foreign judgments on any international uniform law.96 Never-
theless, no judgments have yet been reported in the contracting
states where the convention is already in force, i.e., binding
upon the state courts, concerning software or any other intangi-
ble movables.97
Among scholarly writings, L. Scott Primak from an Ameri-
can point of view has expressed the opinion that the CISG may
be applied to software contracts because computer software is a
new technical product that, as a movable and identifiable sepa-
rate object, should not be categorized differently from any other
"normal," tangible movable good under article 1. He adds that
supporting international trade by statute can only be achieved
95 This basic methodical approach is comparable with an earlier suggestion by
Magnus. See Ulrich Magnus, Wahrungsfragen im Einheitlichen Kaufrecht:
Zugleich ein Beitrag zu seiner Liickenfidilung und Auslegung, 53 RABELSZ 116
(1989).
96 Grundgesetz [Constitution][GG] art. 20 (III)(F.R.G.).
97 Remarkably, in the U.S. where the CISG has been in force since January 1,
1988, there has been no published judgment in this specific area, even though it is
the world's largest market for the import and export of computer software.
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by a wide and flexible interpretation of the CISG; in particular,
its substantive sphere of application. He also remarks that in-
tangible computer software is not explicitly excluded from the
Convention's substantive sphere of application. 98 Arthur Fakes
similarly holds that standard software should generally be re-
garded as a "good" under article 1 since the outer appearance of
a sale of a mass-produced standard computer program does not
differ from the sale of tangible movables. He argues that the
exclusion of electricity in article 2(f) makes clear that the CISG
cannot be applied to purely intangible things and therefore the
transfer of software via on-line database transactions is
excluded.99
John Honnold, in contrast, refers only to the definition of
"goods" under article 2-105(1) of the U.C.C. and infers tacitly
that this definition corresponds to the term "goods" in article 1
of the CISG. Nevertheless, he argues that domestic law, having
been developed for the application of article 2 of the U.C.C. to
software contracts, cannot be applicable because of the special
features of the CISG. He concludes by offering advice to con-
tracting parties to exclude the application of the CISG to any
international software transaction by an explicit contractual
provision because of the existing international uncertainties in-
volved with the characterization of software contracts. 100
The German authors in general hold the opinion that the
term "goods" under the CISG should be broadly interpreted.
Such a definition would contain all things that could be com-
mercially sold. However, this is limited to software that is
transferred by fixation on a tangible (floppy disk) data car-
rier. 01 Martin Karollus, from an Austrian point of view, has
also followed the German authors but extends the substantive
98 See Primak, supra note 9, at 214, 217, 231.
99 See Fakes, supra note 12, at 584.
100 See HoNNoLD, supra note 16; see also CISG, supra note 2, at art. 2.
101 See CZERWENKA, supra note 26, at 138-39. This author makes reference to
the principles of a wide, liberal interpretation as expressed in article 1-102 of the
U.C.C. In her opinion, 1-102 could serve as a model for the CISG. See also, VON
CAEMMERER & SCHLECH'TRIEM-HERBER, supra note 26 art. 1, no. 21; see also,
HOEREN, DER SoF-ARE TBEaLAssuNGsvERTRAG AIS SACHKAUF, CR 908, 916 (1988);
PILTz, UN-KAuFREcHT 48 (1991).
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sphere of application of "goods/marchandises" to electronically
transmitted software, i.e., without any tangible data carrier. 10 2
In summary, the opinions expressed in the scholarly writ-
ings in the Contracting States tend to favor the application of
the CISG to international software contracts with computer
software being subsumed under the term "goods/marchandises"
in article 1. These opinions are similar in that they neither at-
tempted to find an autonomous, internationally uniform inter-
pretation, nor used the trdvaux prdparatoires as a support or
safeguard. This results in a biased interpretation or definition
of the CISG term because of the influence of their respective
"home law."
D. "True" Comparison of Laws as a Method of Interpretation
Within an Autonomous Interpretation Framework
The next step on the interpretation ladder is the "true"
comparison of laws with equivalent norms under the domestic
law of the exemplary contracting states as ultima ratio to
achieve an autonomous, internationally uniform interpretation
of the CISG as provided by article 7(1). When applying this
method of interpretation, one should bear in mind that its ma-
jor goal, within the framework of an autonomous interpretation,
is to warrant interpretational results that are not dominated by
the domestic legal terminology of one system of laws and in the
process, achieve an original, supranational interpretation that
corresponds to the basic principles of the national law of the
contracting states. If, as a result of this comparison of laws
based methodically upon a functional microcomparison of
laws, 10 3 definitions and categorizations of legal terms or con-
cepts correspond to the compared domestic laws, one can safely
conclude that a similar solution or definition within the CISG
will satisfy the objective, normative intentions of the "interna-
tional legislator." This is true, unless a new definition was
clearly intended.
Although the CISG is an "open convention" under article
99, because of the great number of Contracting States to the
102 See KARoLLus, UN-KAUFRECHT 21 (1991).
103 See generally, Zweigert & Katz, Einfiihrung in die Rechtsvergleichung, I
Band 4, 5 (3d ed. 1996); RHEINSTEIN, EINFUHRUNG IN DIE RECHTSVERGLEICHUNG 27,
32. 33 (2d ed. 1987).
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CISG, it is necessary to choose a limited number of states or
systems of law as typical examples.
In categorizing software contracts as contracts for the sale
of goods, the most appropriate legal systems among contracting
states having already ratified the CISG are the German law of
sales under § 433 BGB, and the U.S. law of sales under article 2
of the U.C.C. Both systems of law are chosen as pars pro toto;
the German domestic law for the civil-law countries, and the
U.S. domestic law for the common-law countries. The choice of
German law as an example for civil law countries is based on its
norms that have continually influenced the making of a conven-
tion for the international sale of goods. This is shown by the
participation of German delegates during the preparation of the
1964 Hague Sales Convention and, moreover, the single rules of
the CISG rooted in German domestic law.10 4 Furthermore,
there has been an intensive scholarly discussion in Germany
since 1985 concerning the subsumation of software contracts
under domestic law that has also found its way into judgments
of the Federal Supreme Court (BGH).' 0 5 U.S. model law for
sales in article 2 of the U.C.C. has influenced several rules of
the CISG that were the result of the U.S. delegation's efforts in
shaping the CISG according to the norms found in article 2 of
the U.C.C.10 6 Thus, a comparison to article 2 of the U.C.C. in
domestic (interstate) matters concerning software contracts
may help in the understanding of the rules of the CISG and the
intentions of the "international legislator." It is even more im-
104 The origin of the rules pertaining to "fixing an additional time" in articles
47, 49(b), 63 and 64(b) is evident if one compares them to § 326 or § 634 BGB
("Nachfrist") that have been internationally regarded as a valuable contribution to
the CISG. See KRITZER, GUIDE TO PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS OF THE UNITED NA-
TIONS' CONVENTION ON CoNTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 355
(1989); and Honnold, The New Uniform Law for International Sales, 18 INT'L LAW.
21, 28 (1984). The original initiative for creating a convention for the international
sale of goods came from Ernst Rabel, a German scholar in 1928. A concise history
of the CISG can be found in VON CAMMERER & SCHLECHRTRIEM-HERBER, supra note
26; Einleitung at 25. See also, CISG, supra note 2, at art. 47.
105 The first substantial scholarly writing on this topic under German domestic
law was GoRNY & KILIAN, COMPUTER SOFTWARE UND SACHMANGELHAFTUNG (1985).
As to the judgments of the BGH, see the comprehensive and updated register pro-
vided by MARLY SOFTWAREUBERLASSUNGSVERTRAGE 470 (1991).
106 For a discussion of the direct influences on the shape of the single norms of
the CISG by the U.S. delegation, see, Farnsworth, The Vienna Convention: History
and Scope, 18 INT'L LAw. 17 (1984).
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portant that the question of subsuming software contracts
under article 2 of the U.C.C. was addressed as early as 1979107
and has since been the focal point of intense discussion in the
U.S. As such, one can, by way of a comparison of laws, make
use of a massive amount of scholarly experience and many judg-
ments in that particular area.
E. Categorization of Software Contracts Under German and
U.S. Domestic Sales Law
1. Categorization of Software and Software Contracts Under
German Sales Law According to § 433 1 BGB
For the purpose of categorization under German contract
law, computer software is generally divided into standard and
custom-designed software.
a. State of Opinions as to the Categorization of Custom-
Designed Software Under German Sales Law
The prevailing opinion of the judiciary and scholarly au-
thors categorizes all contracts for the production and transfer of
custom-designed software as contracts of manufacture
("Werkvertrage") according to § 631 BGB or contracts for the
supply of goods and services ("Werklieferungsvertr.Age") accord-
ing to § 651 BGB, and not contracts for the sale of goods.' 0 8
Under German law, the term "custom-designed software" com-
prises all computer programs that are specially designed and
programmed for the particular needs of only one user. 10 9 This
strict categorization can be explained by the specific features of
different types of contracts under the BGB with each having dif-
ferent rules. The categorization as a contract for the sale of
goods according to § 433 BGB presupposes that the object of the
contract is already a finished product. In contrast, if the object
of the contract must be produced by one party before it is trans-
107 Note: Computer Programs as Goods Under the U.C.C., 77 MicH. L.R. 1149
(1979).
108 See judgments of the BGH since its first decision in BGH, WM 615, 616
(1971). One recent case is BGH NJW 3011 (1990), CR 707 (1990). See also,
MUNCHENER KOMMENTAR-SOERGEL supra note 63; § 631 BGB, No. 80 and JUNKER,
supra note 37, at 156.
109 For a discussion of this definition, see JUNKER, supra note 37, at 51, 133; see
also HOEREN, SOFrWAREUBERLASSUNG ALS SACHKAUF 3 (1989).
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ferred to the "customer" as a finished product, the contract is
ordinarily characterized as a manufacture contract11 o or a con-
tract for the supply of goods and services. 1 As such, the intan-
gibility of software does not pose a problem in distinguishing
between a contract for the sale of goods and a contract for the
manufacture or supply of goods and services. The labor and
services rendered in producing custom-designed software are
regarded as the prevailing element of the contract that is there-
fore categorized accordingly.
b. Judgments of the BGH Involving the Categorization of
Standard Software Under German Sales Law
For quite a while, the BGH primarily dealt with the catego-
rization of software contracts that involved a combined transfer
of standard software with hardware. 1 2 The term "standard
software" is used by German law to describe computer pro-
grams manufactured as copies designed for a range of applica-
tion for an unlimited number of users.113 The BGH held that
such software contracts could be subsumed under the rules of a
contract for the sale of goods. 1 4 This characterization required
that the basic structure of the contract consists of a sales trans-
action since the object of the contract, for example, a tangible
data carrier (floppy disk) with the computer program stored on
it, represents a tangible thing. The court continued, stating
that the storage of the originally intangible computer program
consisting of pure thought on a tangible data carrier transforms
the program itself into a combined tangible movable object that
can be the subject of a commercial sale. 1 5
The BGH has left open the question of whether the norms
for the sale of goods can be directly applied, or by way of anal-
110 § 631 BGB
Ill § 651 BGB
112 See, e.g., BGH 29.3, (1983); WM 685 (1983); BGH 20.6 (1984); WM 1089
(1984); and BGH 4.11 (1987) BGHZ 102, 135, DB 105 (1988)(Basic-iibersetzung-
sprogramm) For similarities, see also BGH, NJW 3011 (1990).
113 For a discussion of this definition, see JUNKER, supra note 37, at 51; and
HOEREN, supra note 113, at 3. Minor services for the ultimate user such as instal-
lation of a printer driver for a standard word-processing program does not alter the
"standard" status of the software.
114 See § 433 I BGB.
115 See BGH 102, 135, 144; DB 105, 106 (1988). (Basic-iibersetzung-
sprogramm); see BGH. NJW 3011 (1990).
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ogy and whether the isolated computer program can be re-
garded as "Kaufsache""1 6  if it is entirely transmitted
electronically. Only in one case did the BGB focus on the issue
of the applicability of the German Hire-Purchase Act
("Abzahlungsgesetz"/AbzG) when it had to categorize a contract
that involved the direct electronic transfer of a computer pro-
gram via a cord from the "seller's" computer to the "buyer's"
computer. The Hire-Purchase Act requires that there is a con-
tract for the sale of a movable thing.117 In the case, the BGH
referred to one of its earlier decisions, stating that under § 90
BGB, a computer program becomes a tangible movable object if
it is stored on a tangible data carrier. As such, the court charac-
terized the entire software contract in question, a contract for
the sale of goods as provided by § 1 AbzG. The court's decisive
reasoning in holding the contract a sale of goods, was that the
computer program had been directly transferred to the buyer's
computer by using a technical device or means for the transmis-
sion instead of using a tangible data carrier." 8
c. Scholarly Writings Involving the Categorization of
Standard Software Under German Sales Law
The opinion of German scholars as to the contractual char-
acterization of standard software contracts differs from court
holdings especially concerning their respective dogmatic rea-
soning. However, there is a basic consensus among the scholars
that software contracts involving the permanent transfer of
standard software are concurrently categorized as contracts for
the sale of goods according to § 433 I BGB. l" a It is still contro-
116 See the definition of "Goods" under § 433 I BGB.
117 See § 1(1) AbZG.
11s BGH, DB 2596 (1989); JZ 17, 19 (1991).
119 See Brandi-Dohrn, Die gewdihrleistungsrechtliche Einordnung des
Softwareuiberlassungsvertrags, CR 63, 66 (1986); see also Kilian, Haftung ftir
Softwaremdngel, in GORNY & KILIAN supra note 109, at 19, 21.; HOEREN supra note
113, at 31-32; MALZER, DER SOFTWAREVERTRAG 84, 85, 91 (1991); Tellis, Gewahr-
leistungsanspriiche bei Sachmingeln von Anwendersoftware, BB 500, 501 (1990);
VON OHLEN, DIE RECHTLICHE EINORDNUING DES SOFTWAREOBERLASSUNGSVERTRAGS
31, 32 (1990); PALANDT-PUTZO, Bo-RGERLICHES GESETZBUCH (54th ed. 1995); § 433
BGB No. 5 mwN; REINIEKE & TIEDKE, KAUFREcHT 134 (4th ed. 1989). A distinction
is not required with regards to commercial sales and the term "goods" used in § 1
HGB because the problem of "tangibility" is the same. The rules of the BGB have
to be applied to commercial sales accordingly, except that the term "goods" applies
in contrast to §§ 433, 90 BGB only to movables. See MUNCHENER KoMMENTAR-
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versial whether software contracts could be directly categorized
as sales contracts with software being the equivalent of "nor-
mal," tangible goods and whether this categorization could also
be upheld if the computer program is electronically transmitted
without the help of any tangible data carrier. Moreover, some
authors even favor the application of the statutory remedies
provided for in a manufacture contract 120 instead of those for a
sales contract if the software is defective. 121 Among scholars,
the accurate opinion prevails according to the judgment of the
BGH involving the Hire-Purchase Act, to regard the electronic
transfer of software just as a modern technical device forming
part of the seller's main contractual obligation. As such, this no
longer affects the initial contractual categorization of a software
contract. 122
As the result of this comparison, one can conclude that con-
tracts for the permanent transfer of standard software for a
price are categorized as contracts for the sale of goods, pursuant
to § 433 BGB, by both the judiciary and legal scholars.
Although there is yet to be a judgment by the BGH that catego-
rizes an electronically transferred computer program as an ob-
ject for a contract for the sale of goods, one can infer from the
BGH's judgment concerning the German Hire-Purchase Act
that such a software contract involving the purchase of stan-
dard software will be categorized as a contract for the sale of
goods even if software is an intangible movable. 23
2. Categorization of Software and Software Contracts Under
Article 2 of the U.C.C.
a. Scholarly Writings
Among U.S. scholarly writings, it has been the prevailing
opinion that software contracts can generally be characterized
as contracts for the sale of goods under article 2. This charac-
HOLCH supra note 69; § 90 BGB, No. 19; SCHLEGELBERGER & HILDEBRANDT-
STECKHAN, HGB, 1.Vol., (5th ed. 1973); § 1 HGB No. 32, 33.
120 See § 633 BGB.
121 See TELLIS, supra note 123, at 91.
122 See MALZER, supra note 123, at 91.
123 Additionally, contracts for the supply of energy such as electricity have
been permanently characterized by the German Supreme Courts as contracts for
the sale of goods according to § 433 I BGB. See, e.g., RGZ 86, 12, 14 (1914) and
BGHZ 23, 173.
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terization makes no distinction between standard and custom-
designed software and additionally makes such characteriza-
tion even if the same definitions and distinctions of software
and software contracts used in German law are being used
under U.S. law. 124 The reason for this, as given by some au-
thors, is that the term "goods" in article 2-105(1) does not pre-
suppose a tangible thing as the object of the sales contract. The
essential elements of "goods" are the movability and identifica-
tion at the time of the sale. Without these elements, property in
the "goods" cannot be transferred and would thus render the
"goods" virtually unsalable. 125 Moreover, neither the defini-
tions in article 2-105 nor other sections of the article expressly
exclude intangible things from its substantive sphere of
application.
Courts have also characterized contracts for the supply of
electricity as contracts for the sale of goods though electricity is
an incorporeal, intangible thing. 26 As such, software needs to
be characterized as a "good" without looking at questions con-
cerning the protection or transfer of intellectual property em-
bedded in a computer. This is necessary because the transfer of
property is dogmatically a completely independent issue and
does not affect the initial characterization of software as a possi-
ble object of a sales contract.' 27 Besides, it is said that a con-
tract for custom designed software results in the transfer of a
ready-to-use computer program as the final product, similar to
standard software, so that the former has "specially manufac-
124 See, e.g., Horovitz, supra note 37, at 129, 138, 151; Meza, Analysts Interna-
tional Corporation v. Recycled Paper Products, Inc.: Is Custom-Designed Software
a 'Good' Under Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code?, 3 SoFrWARE L.J. 548
(1989); Rodau, Computer Software: Does Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code
Apply?, 35 EMORY L.J. 853(1986); Computer Programs as Goods Under the U.C.C.,
supra note 123, at 1149.
125 See Holmes, Application of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code to
Computer System Acquisitions, 9 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1 (1982);
Horovitz, supra note 37, at 129; Meza, supra note 128, at 543; Rodau, supra note
128, at 853; Computer Programs as Goods Under the U.C.C., supra note 123, at
1149.
126 For a discussion of the characterization of electricity supply contracts as
sale of goods, see Fickeisen v. Wheeling Elec. Co., 67 W.Va. 335, 67 S.E. 788 (1910);
and Helfey v. Warbash County REMC, 151 Ind. App. 176, 179, 278 N.E. 2d 608,
610 (1972); See also 1 A. SQUILLANTrE & FONSECA, WILUSTON ON SALES § 5-13. (4th
ed. 1973 & Supp. 1991).
127 See Rodau, supra note 128, at 919.
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tured goods" as their object. This is expressly provided for in
article 2-105(1) of the U.C.C.128
In applying article 2 of the U.C.C. to software contracts it is
dogmatically required that any additional services rendered in
connection with the contract do not prevail over the transfer of
the produced computer program. If this were so, the contract
would be categorized as a contract for the supply of services to
which only the non-unified common law of the states is applica-
ble. This second categorization uses the "predominant purpose
test" which weighs two factors; services and the transfer of
goods.
The subjective approach of the "predominant purpose test"
is applied to the construction of all contracts and therefore dis-
regards the intangible nature of software. Only one author has
so far expressed the opinion that the inapplicability of article 2
follows necessarily from the fact of the intangible nature of
software. 129
b. The Judiciary: Judgments of State and Federal Courts
The many judgments rendered by federal and state courts
involving the categorization of software contracts as contracts
for the sale of goods under article 2 of the UCC are incoherent
and often dogmatically perplexing.130 Regarding the character-
ization of software transferred independently from hardware,
the pendulum of judicial opinion swings from "intangible knowl-
edge" in early decisions to the direct characterization of a com-
puter program as a "good" under article 2-105(1) of the UCC.131
If one separates those judgments that deal with combined
software contracts, i.e., consisting of the transfer of software
only in connection with hardware, there remain only a few sig-
128 See Holmes, supra note 129, at 115, 126 (discussion of "final product test");
see also Horovitz, supra note 37, at 162.
129 See Durney, The Warranty of Merchantability and Computer Software Con-
tracts: A Square Peg Won't Fit in a Round Hole, 59 Wash. L.Rev. 511 (1984).
130 The reason for this lies not in the differing versions of article 2 being in
force in the United States, but in the independence of the judiciary and the lack of
a doctrine of stare decisis between federal and state courts.
131 See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Ft. Worth v. Bullock, 584 S.W.2d 548 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1979); and Honeywell Information Systems, Inc. v. Maricopa Cty., Ariz. App.
575 P.2d 801. These decisions involved tax law that served as guidelines for deci-
sions on the characterization of software as goods under article 2 of the U.C.C.
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nificant decisions involving the basic problem of characterizing
the intangible computer program as a "good" under the UCC.
The majority of other decisions characterize software contracts
as contracts for the sale of goods under article 2 without any
dogmatic differentiation. In these cases, software, the object of
the contract, is indirectly characterized as a "good."132 During
the years 1989 to 1991, a "new generation" of federal court cases
addressed the applicability of article 2 of the UCC to software
contracts. These cases described below, are notable in their de-
tailed and dogmatically specific opinions.
In RRX Industries v.Lab-Con, Inc.,'133 the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit characterized a standard computer
program transferred by a tangible data carrier a "good" accord-
ing to article 2-105(1) of the UCC.13 4 The court deemed the
software contract a contract for the sale of goods by applying the
predominant-factor test. 3 5 Although the Court of Appeals did
not specifically focus on the problem of the intangibility of the
computer program, the decision is nevertheless important be-
cause it was the first time a federal court had directly charac-
terized an isolated computer program unconnected with the
sale of hardware as a "good" under article 2-105 of the UCC.
In 1987, the U.S. District Court in Analysts International
Corporation v. Recycled Paper Products, Inc.,136 followed the re-
sult in RRX Industries and categorized a software contract that
included the manufacturing and installing of a custom-designed
computer program as a contract for the sale of goods under arti-
cle 2 of the UCC. 13 7 The main issue the court addressed here
was not whether an intangible computer program was a "good";
it was to decide whether under the predominant factor test the
sale prevailed over the services. 138 Thus, the court did not ad-
dress the intangibility issue in detail. In applying the predomi-
nant-factor test to the whole contract, the court ruled that the
132 See, e.g., Atlas Indus. Inc. v. Natl Cash Register Co., 216 Kan. 213, 531
P.2d 41 (1975); Applications, Inc. V. Hewlett-Packard Co., 501 F.Supp. 129
(S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd 672 F.2d 1076 (2d Cir. 1982).
133 772 F.2d 543 (9th Cir. 1985).
134 Id. at 546.
135 Id.
136 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5611, *11.
137 Id.
138 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5611, *10.
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extensive services rendered in producing this custom-designed,
computer-program were necessary for achieving the ready-to-
use program as the final result. 139 As such, the U.S. District
Court concluded that it was impossible to distinguish this cus-
tom-designed software from any other "specially manufactured
goods" as mentioned in article 2-105(1) of the UCC.14 °
The decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit in Advent Systems Ltd. v. Unisys Corporation1 4' is espe-
cially notable because of its excellent analysis of the judgments
and scholarly writings 142 available at the time. The software
contract at issue involved the transfer of hardware, the manu-
facturing of a custom-designed computer program, and the ren-
dering of elaborate instructions on an hourly basis to the
"buyer."'143
In its analysis, the Court of Appeals relied on the legisla-
tive principles and goals contained in article 1-102 that promote
commercial transactions and practices through liberal contract
interpretation.'4 The court held that the term "goods" in arti-
cle 2-105(1) must also be liberally interpreted to apply the uni-
fied rules of article 2 to a variety of commercial transactions. 145
As such, the court determined that the term "goods" encom-
passes all personal property that is transferrable and identifi-
able except those things that are expressly excluded by article
2-105 itself.146
When intangible intellectual ideas existing in a computer
program are transferred to a computer-readable medium or
data carrier they automatically become "goods" in the same way
a musical composition becomes fixed when recorded on a com-
pact disc. Therefore, it was unimportant to the court whether
the software could be separately protected as representing in-
tellectual property, since a computer program stored in a com-
puter-readable form on a data carrier had already become a
139 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5611, *11.
140 Id. See also Meza supra note 128, at 543.
141 925 F.2d 670 (3rd Cir. 1991).
142 See Schlinsog, Advent Systems Ltd. v. Unisys Corporation: U.C.C. Governs
Software Transactions, 4 SoFTwAE L.J. 611 (1991).
143 Advent Systems, 925 F.2d at 674.
144 Id. at 675.
145 Id.
146 Id.
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transferrable, identifiable, commercially salable and movable
object, sufficient for its characterization as a "good."147
The court ended its analysis by applying the predominant-
factor test because of the substantial services offered by the
"seller" and reached the conclusion that the "sale" was the pre-
vailing factor of the software contract. 148 Taking the subjective
approach, the court based this decision solely on the parties'
intentions.149
Although a detailed decision, this judgment lacks a proper
distinction between the transferable, identifiable computer pro-
gram as a separate, independent, object of a sales contract and
the data carrier as a pure means for storage or transmission.
Legal issues could arise in the event software is electronically
transmitted. Based on the liberal interpretation of "goods" by
the court in Advent Systems, one can conclude that the different
means for transferring a computer program are completely ir-
relevant. Even an electronic transmission presupposes that the
computer program has been transformed from its intellectual
existence into a computer-readable form and therefore the es-
sential metamorphosis from pure idea to "good" already took
place somewhere in the past.
V. SUMMARY: THE AUTONOMOUS INTERPRETATION AND
DEFINITION OF THETERM "GOODS/MARCHANDISES" IN
ARTICLE 1 OF THE CISG AS APPLIED TO
SOFTWARE CONTRACTS
In applying the results of an autonomous interpretation,
especially of a "true" comparison of law, one must avoid "rejec-
tions" by the CISG when transplanting those results, since
there is no concurrent legal or dogmatic tradition between the
domestic laws of the contracting states and the rules of the Con-
vention. 150 By applying the sales law analogously, and based on
a comparison of laws by the autonomous interpretation of the
147 Id. Real property, money, and investment securities are explicitly excluded
by article 2-105(1) of the U.C.C. The liberal interpretation of the term "goods"
applied here by the Court of Appeals stems from the case of Lobianco v. Property
Prot., Inc., 292 Pa. Super. 346, 437 A.2d 417 (1981).
148 925 F.2d at 676.
149 Id.
150 For a discussion of the problems in applying comparative law methods, see
Kahn-Freund, On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, 37 M.L.R. 1 (1974).
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term "goods/marchandises," software contracts under both Ger-
man and U.S. domestic sales law are generally characterized as
contracts for the sale of goods.151
Despite the many differences in both systems of law, there
is surprisingly the same dogmatic problem of applying domestic
sales law to software contracts since software contracts involve
incorporate, intangible things and traditionally, only tangible
movables or things were regarded as proper objects for a con-
tract for the sale of goods. Nevertheless, in both systems of law,
exceptions have concurrently been made to contracts for the
supply of electricity that have been, in analogy, characterized as
contracts for the sale of goods by equating electricity to tangible
movables. 152
The distinction under German law between standard
software and custom-designed software is unsuitable for an au-
tonomous interpretation under the CISG and would only pro-
voke a "rejection": This distinction is entirely based on the
contractual categories of a manufacture and sales contract
under the specific features of the BGB, whereas article 3 of the
CISG involves a different concept. The CISG treats "goods to be
manufactured" the same as "finished goods." Thus, the exclu-
sion of custom-designed software from the sale of goods con-
tracts under German domestic law153 is inapplicable in a
comparison of laws for an autonomous interpretation of article 1
of the CISG.
By using the definition found in article 2-105 of the UCC, a
definition essentially based on the needs of commercial trade, it
is possible to autonomously define the term "goods/mar-
i15 Interestingly enough, the prevailing opinion among scholars in England
also favor an analogous application of the Sale of Goods Act to computer software
contracts; see Kirk, supra note 37, at 229. See also Smith, supra note 37, at 35-38,
52. Under English sales law, the distinction between standard software and cus-
tom-designed software is also irrelevant because the definition of "goods" in section
61(1) of the Sale of Goods Act includes "future goods." The Australian decision in
Toby Construction Products Ltd. v. Computa Bar (Sales) Pty. Ltd. 2 N.S.W.L.R. 38
(1983) as persuasive authority was the starting point for the English opinion de-
scribed above. See also, Cavanagh, supra note 37, at 195.
152 See RGZ 86, 12, 14; BGHZ 23, 173; and Fickeisen v. Wheeling Elec. Co., 67
W.Va. 335, 67 S.E. 788 (1910); Helvey v. Wabash Cnty. REMC, 151 Ind. App. 176,
179, 278 N.E.2d 608, 610 (1972). A more recent case is Belotti v. Duquesne Corp.,
4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 1393 (1987).
153 BGB art. 433.
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chandises" found in article 1 of the CISG. The CISG term com-
prises "all movables, including things to be manufactured
("future goods") that can be identified as forming the object of
the sale and in which personal property can be transferred."154
Such a broad, autonomous definition of the term "goods/mar-
chandises" complies with the legislative goal expressly stated in
the preamble of the Convention; namely, removing legal barri-
ers to international trade and thus providing the international
commercial community with legal stability and predictability.
Software, then, can be subsumed under this autonomous
definition of "goods/marchandises," since a computer program
can be transmitted or transferred by technical means that make
it a "movable." It can be identified as the object of a sale when it
'arrives" at the buyer's computer. The means of transmission is
irrelevant for the initial characterization because the transfer
of the software already forms part of the performance by the
seller. A computer program, in the end, is just a new technical
product that does not fit into the traditional categories of the
domestic law of the contracting states, but is, in practice,
bought and sold as any tangible movable.
Intellectual property embedded in a computer program is
transferred by licensing agreements that work independently of
the sales contract. As such, the seller may, at the conclusion of
the sales contract, agree with the buyer not to transfer the prop-
erty in the computer program, and merely grant a license for
using the software. This is despite the fact that the seller is
generally obligated under article 30 of the CISG to transfer the
property in the goods. However, this obligation can be modified
by the contract. 155
Therefore, the substantive sphere of application of the
CISG extends to all international sales contracts despite
whether the subject matter of the contract is standard software
or custom-designed software, or whether the software is trans-
mitted electronically or by means of a tangible data carrier.
Nevertheless, the same restrictions as to the applicability of the
CISG to contracts for the transfer of tangible goods also extend
to software contracts. Thus, the CISG cannot be applied to
mixed-transactions, software contracts in which, according to
154 U.C.C. § 2-105(1).
155 See CISG supra note 2, at art. 6.
336 [Vol. 8:303
34http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol8/iss2/2
SOFTWARE CONTRACTS AND THE CISG
article 3, the supply of labor or other services form the major
part of the obligation. Neither can the CISG be applied to con-
tracts for the supply of manufactured goods, e.g., custom-
designed software, if the buyer supplies a substantial part of
the necessary materials for the manufacturing. 156
VI. THE FUTURE REALIZATION OF AN AUTONOMOUS,
INTERNATIONALLY UNIFORM INTERPRETATION OF THE CISG
Legal scholars and practitioners in contracting states be-
heve that the best way to bring about an autonomous, interna-
tionally uniform interpretation of the CISG while preserving
legal unity between contracting states is to establish an "inter-
national supreme court" modeled after the EuGH. Such a court
would have jurisdiction as a final appeals court for the interpre-
tation of international uniform law, including the CISG. 157
Since there will be no agreement on the political level for estab-
lishing such an international supreme court in the near future,
the responsibility for realizing a true legal union rests with the
judges and lawyers in the Contracting States. They are called
upon to safeguard autonomous and internationally uniform re-
sults in interpreting the Convention. 158 Those results can be
achieved by applying the above-mentioned "interpretation lad-
der" as an autonomous method for interpreting International
Uniform Law and avoiding any particular nationalistic
approach.
Maintaining uniformity via an autonomous interpretation
does, however, require information involving the international
status of opinions in the judiciary and scholarly writings. For
this purpose, UNCITRAL has established a central "informa-
tion pool" in Vienna for collecting judgments and scholarly writ-
ings on all UNCITRAL's model laws and conventions. These
"inputs" of information, supplied by official, national reporters
named by each member state of UNCITRAL, are then dissemi-
156 Another type of contract excluded from the Convention's sphere of applica-
tion is a "consumer contract," involving the sale of goods for personal, family or
household use. See CISG supra note 2, at art. 2(a).
157 See, e.g., C.M. BiANcA & M.J. BONNELL, COMMENTARY ON THE INTERATIONAL
SALES LAW: THE 1980 VIENNA SALES CONVENTION, 88 (1987). See also, CISG supra
note 2, at art. 7.
158 CISG supra note 2, at art. 7.
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nated and revised by the Secretariat in yearbooks. 159 In the fu-
ture, UNCITRAL plans to establish direct access to a computer-
based data bank.'60 The multiple advantages can already be
seen in the timesaving private data banks such as Juris, LEXIS
and WESTLAW. One may hope those courts in the contracting
states will realize an autonomous, internationally uniform in-
terpretation of the CISG according to article 7(1) with the
assistance of the "interpretation ladder." As such, a cautious,
responsible interpretation of international uniform law is re-
quired to prevent new legal dissipation because of short-
sighted, nationalistic approaches.
159 Yearbooks of UNCITRAL include case law on UNCITRAL Texts (CLOUT).
160 For a discussion of UNCITRAL and its future information disseminating
methods, see Diedrich, Chancen und Ziele von Einheitsrecht fNr den internation-
alen Handelsverkehr, IPRax 408, 411 (1992). The "information pool" was initiated
by UNCITRAL in 1988. See UNCITRAL-Yb XIX 15, 16 (1988).
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